

**Preserving India’s Diplomatic Capital: The Case of India’s Counterterrorism
Initiatives relating to the United Nations Al-Qaida Financial Sanctions
Regime**

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1. Prime Minister Modi’s impressive mandate during the 2014 Indian General Elections and his dynamic and stellar leadership of the Indian people during the last two and a half years and a little more has made him accumulate huge political capital.
2. To add to the political capital Prime Minister Modi’s active and productive engagement with countries in the Indian Ocean Region and beyond has helped India garner tremendous diplomatic capital.
3. A part of this diplomatic capital is being expended in efforts to designate Mazood Azhar by the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime. However, due to the continued rejection of India’ efforts to make this designation a reality, it appears that India may be squandering precious diplomatic capital to no productive end.
4. While the efforts to designate Azhar continue, and may eventually bear fruit, albeit with expense of precious diplomatic capital on India’s part, there are other concrete steps in addition that the Government of India may like to engage in to ensure that its diplomatic capital is preserved and its diplomatic leverage enhanced.
5. First, the Government of India may like to write to the Chairperson of the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee requesting that the Al-Qaida Monitoring Team provide information (from the date of each designation onwards) on the nature of assets frozen (both moveable and fixed); the value of assets frozen; the banks and locations in which such assets were frozen; the exact dates when they were frozen with respect to individuals and entities already designated by the UN Al-Qaida sanctions regime including Jaish-e-Mohammad (the organization to which Masood Azhar belongs),

Hafeez Saeed and his co-designated colleagues from the Lashkar-e-Taiba designated organization, and other listed individuals and entities perpetration terrorist attacks against India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and other countries in South Asia. Data thus gathered by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Monitoring Team would shed valuable light on the effectiveness of implementation of sanctions against Al-Qaida individuals and entities active in South Asia. Mere listing of Al-Qaida entities and individuals does not mean much if the sanctions are not implemented and tainted assets of such listed individuals and entities frozen. And the effectiveness of implementation of sanctions is questionable if there is no data to demonstrate its success.

6. Second, the Government of India may like to write to the Chairperson of the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee requesting that the Al-Qaida Monitoring Team undertake a study (which is long overdue) to ascertain the impact of UN sanctions against the aforementioned individuals and entities and present the report to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee for consideration. The mere “naming and shaming” of listed individuals and entities does through UN designation not often lead to the impairing of terrorist financing and infrastructure which is the ultimate objective of the UN sanctions regime in the first place.
7. The information gathered in response to the above requests by the Government of India would help inform its efforts regards the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime; preserve much needed diplomatic capital; further contribute to the valiant efforts of Prime Minister Modi in tackling and overcoming the scourge of terrorism from South Asia, the larger Indian Ocean Region, and beyond; and build global Indian leadership on counterterrorism.